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Further Cross-Country Evidence on the Accuracy of
the Private Sector’s Output Forecasts
GRACE JUHN and PRAKASH LOUNGANI*
This paper evaluates the performance of Consensus Forecasts of real GDP growth
for a large number of industrialized and developing countries for the time period
October 1989 to December 1999. The questions addressed are the following: How
accurate are private sector forecasts? How does their accuracy compare with that
of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook? How well do forecasters predict rare
events such as recessions or crises? Is discord among forecasters associated with
lower forecast accuracy? [JEL C5, E3, D8]
“ . . . the ability to produce accurate predictions of the course of the economy
in the near-term is probably the main criterion by which the public judges
the usefulness of our entire profession.”
Victor Zarnowitz (1986, p. 1)
T
his paper evaluates the performance of Consensus Forecasts of real GDP
growth for a large number of industrialized and developing countries for the
time period October 1989 to December 1999. The questions addressed are the
following:
•H ow accurate are private sector forecasts?
•H ow  does their accuracy compare with that of the IMF’s World Economic
Outlook? 
•H ow well do forecasters predict rare events such as recessions or crises? 
• Is discord among forecasters associated with lower forecast accuracy?
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acknowledge useful comments from Frank Diebold. The evidence on such questions is useful for a number of reasons. First,
private sector capital flows have supplanted official funds as the dominant form of
external financing for many countries. Hence, private-sector assessments of the
relative macroeconomic outlook for various countries play a role in guiding the
allocation of capital across the globe. 
Second, many in the “official” sector are increasingly relying on these fore-
casts as a summary of the private sector’s assessment of the macroeconomic
outlook. In addition to being extensively used in the multilateral institutions for
this purpose,1 Consensus Forecasts are used by national government agencies, as
revealed for example in the following quote from a speech by New Zealand’s
central bank governor Donald Brash (1998):
“We do not ourselves make forecasts of the international economy, but
instead use the monthly Consensus Forecasts. . . . We certainly have no
reason to believe that we could produce better forecasts for our overseas
markets than can the forecasters ‘on the ground’in the countries concerned.”
Third, growth forecasts are an important component for several other fore-
casts, such as those of the trade balance and government fiscal balance.
Despite the increasing visibility of Consensus Forecasts, there has been very
little independent analysis of their accuracy. To our knowledge, the only studies
are by Artis (1997), Batchelor (1997), Harvey, Leybourne and Newbold (1999),
and Gallo, Granger and Jeon (2002). The first two restrict attention to the G-7
countries, the third to the United Kingdom, and the last to the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Japan.2
I. Data Description and Terminology
Consensus Forecasts has provided macroeconomic forecasts for industrialized
countries on a monthly basis since October 1989. Over time, the coverage has
expanded to encompass many developing countries; forecasts for these countries
are reported in the publication’s off-shoots, namely, Latin American Consensus
Forecasts (published bimonthly since 1993), Asia Pacific Consensus Forecasts
(monthly since 1995), and Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (bi-monthly since
1998). Each of these publications surveys a number of prominent financial and
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1Publications such as the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO), the World Bank’s Global
Economic Prospects (GEP), and the OECD’s Economic Outlook (EO) contain references to the Consensus
forecasts. See, for instance, WEO: Interim Assessment (December 1997, pp. 34–36), Staff Studies for the
WEO (December 1997, pp. 23–25), and GEP (1999, p. 9). 
2Earlier work by Loungani (2001a and b) also contains an evaluation of Consensus Forecasts of
output growth. This paper builds on that work in five ways: (1) the entire sequence of bi-monthly fore-
casts is studied, instead of just the April and October forecasts; (2) forecast encompassing tests are
presented to test more formally for the relative information content of private and official sector forecasts,
instead of the scatter plots presented in the earlier work; (3) evidence is presented on directional accuracy
of consensus and WEO forecasts; (4) the relationship between forecaster discord and forecast accuracy is
studied; and (5) the sample period is extended by a year, not a trivial increase when the sample period is
as short as it is here. The additional year is particularly useful in updating the evidence on forecasting
recessions that was presented in the earlier work.economic analysts and reports their individual forecasts as well as simple statis-
tics summarizing the distribution of forecasts. The focus of this paper is on the
mean forecast (the “consensus”) and the standard deviation across forecasters.3
Table 1 provides a list of the 63 countries used in the analysis, the sample
period over which forecasts are available for each, and whether they are classified
as an “industrialized” country or a “developing” country. As noted, for the indus-
trialized countries the forecasts start in October 1989 (with a single exception).
For the developing countries, the starting dates are more varied: in about 25
percent of the cases, the starting date is between October 1989 and October 1993;
in the remaining cases, the starting date is January 1995. Most of results in this
paper are based on an “unbalanced” panel (i.e., countries enter the sample at
different dates) in order to make use of all available information. 
The “event” being forecast is annual average real GDP growth. Every month
(or, as noted above, every other month in the case of Latin American or East
European countries) a new forecast is made of this event. To ensure consistency of
treatment across countries, we study the bi-monthly sequence of forecasts for each
event. To take a concrete example, suppose that the event is 1999 real GDP
growth. The sequence of forecasts that we study for this event are the twelve fore-
casts made between February 1998 and December 1999. The first six forecasts, the
ones made during 1998, are referred to as year-ahead forecasts; the six forecasts
made during 1999 are called current-year forecasts. 
In discussing the results, it will sometimes be convenient to index the forecasts
by the forecasting horizon, the number of months before the terminal date. So, to
continue the example, the February 1998 forecast is considered as made at a 23-
month horizon and the December 1999 forecast as made at a one-month horizon. 
The comparison with IMF forecasts is made on the basis of the April and
October forecasts, both year-ahead and current-year. In terms of the notation just
discussed, these are the forecasts made at horizons 21, 15, 9, and 3 months.
II. Accuracy of Private Sector Forecasts
The forecast errors are given by:
e(t) = A(t) – F(t), (1)
where A(t) is a vector of growth outcomes (the “actuals”), and F(t) is the corre-
sponding vector of forecasts. A perennial issue in the forecasting literature is
whether the “actual” value should correspond to the early releases of the data or
later revisions. Using a very early release may not be satisfactory as the number
may be highly preliminary. But using the final release may not be satisfactory
either as it may incorporate information (such as revisions of weights, changes in
methods of construction, etc.) that forecasters simply could not have been aware
of at the time of the forecast. Given our large sample of countries, there will likely
be quite a few data revisions of this kind. Our compromise is to use the real GDP
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3In future work, it would be interesting to examine the properties of the median forecast as well.data as reported in the May WEO of the following year—this likely falls in
between a highly preliminary number and later revised versions.4
Three measures of forecast accuracy are used. The first is the Mean Absolute
Error (MAE), which is the average across all countries and over all years of the
differences between actual and forecast values, disregarding the sign of the error.
The second is the root mean square error (RMSE). To compute RMSE, the forecast
errors are squared and averaged over the sample to get the mean squared error
(MSE); RMSE is the square root of MSE. The third measure, Theil’s U-Statistic
(TU), is defined as follows:
TU(t) = RMSE(t)/(√[ (A(t)–A(t–1))
2/n] (2)
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4For example, the 1990 forecast was compared to the realization as reported in the May 1991 WEO.
In cases where this was not possible, because the data were not reported, we used the first available real-
ization reported in the WEO.
Table 1. List of Countries
Developing Countries
Industrialized Asia-Pacific Latin American Transition and 
Country Group Countries Economies Economies Other Economies
List of Countries Austria (1) Bangladesh (4) Argentina (4) Bulgaria (4)
Australia (1) China (4) Bolivia (4) Czech Republic (4)
Belgium (1) Hong Kong (2)  Brazil (1) Hungary (2)
Canada (1) India (4) Chile (4) Poland (2)
Denmark (1) Indonesia (2) Colombia (4) Romania (4)
Finland (1) Korea (1) Costa Rica (4) Russia (4)
France (1) Malaysia (1) Dominican Rep. (4) Slovakia (4)
Germany (1) Pakistan (4) Ecuador (4)  Slovenia (4)
Greece (3) Philippines (4) Mexico (1) Ukraine (4)
Ireland (1) Singapore(1) Panama (4) 
Israel (1) Sri Lanka (4) Paraguay (4)  Egypt (4)
Italy (1) Taiwan (1) Peru (4) Saudi Arabia (4)
Japan (1) Thailand (2) Uruguay (4)  South Africa (3)









Sample Period (1) From Oct. 1989  (1) From Oct. 1989 (1) From Oct. 1989 (2) From April 1991
(3) From Oct. 1993  (2) From April 1991 (4) From Jan. 1995 (3) From Oct. 1993
(4) From Jan. 1995 (4) From Jan. 1995TU accomplishes two things. It scales RMSE by the variability of the under-
lying data, and it offers a way of evaluating forecasting performance relative to a
“naive” forecast of no change in the growth rate between t–1 and t. TUs of less
than 1 are said to beat the naive forecast.
The results are reported in Table 2, for the full sample and also for the indus-
trialized and developing countries separately. There are two clear findings. First,
as one would expect, the magnitude of the forecast error declines as the forecast
horizon gets shorter. For instance, MAE for the full sample is 2 percent at a 23-
month horizon and declines to just under 1 percent at the one-month horizon.
Similar patterns are evident for RMSE and TU. 
Second, while in absolute terms errors are larger for developing countries than
for the industrialized countries (as shown by the MAE and RMSE columns), taking
account of the variability of the underlying data reverses this conclusion. Values
of TU are always a bit higher for the industrialized country sample than for devel-
oping countries. Another way of thinking about this result is that the year-ahead
forecasts for industrialized countries either do not beat the naive forecast of an
unchanged growth rate or just barely beat it, whereas for developing countries they
do notably better than a naive forecast.
How accurate are the private sector’s output forecasts? One way to try to
answer this question to note that real GDP growth averaged about 3 percent a year
over this period (2.3 percent for industrialized countries; 3.6 percent for devel-
oping). Against this context, the accuracy of the forecasts, particularly of the year-
ahead forecasts, is not particularly impressive. 
A preferable, and less subjective, attempt to evaluate accuracy is to compare
the private sector’s forecast against those of forecasts available from other sources.
The next section compares private sector’s forecasts against another prominent
source of cross-country forecasts, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO).
III. Comparison of Private Sector and IMF Forecasts
The IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO), published in May and October of
each year, reports current-year and year-ahead forecasts for member countries. For
about 50 of the largest countries—accounting for 90 percent of world output—the
forecasts are updated for each WEO exercise; these countries are referred to as
“Group A” countries. For the other countries, the WEO forecasts are from the most
recent Article IV consultation or IMF program document, but they are “incremen-
tally adjusted to reflect changes in assumptions and global economic conditions.”5
The May WEO forecasts are compared with the April private sector Consensus
Forecasts, and the October WEO forecasts with the October consensus.6
Table 3 presents measures of accuracy for the two sources of forecasts. It is
evident that the accuracy of the private sector’s forecasts is in almost every case a
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5Preface to October 1998 WEO.
6The correlation between Consensus Forecasts for any two adjacent months is very high, 0.95 or
better. This suggests that our results are not likely to have been much affected by using the May forecasts
instead of the April forecasts.Grace Juhn and Prakash Loungani
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Table 2. Accuracy of Private Sector Forecasts
Mean Root Mean Theil’s
Absolute Error Square Error U-Statistic
Year-ahead or Current-year Horizon (MAE)( RMSE)( TU)
All countries
Year-ahead 23 2.10 3.32 0.86
Year-ahead 21 2.08 3.28 0.85
Year-ahead 19 2.03 3.21 0.83
Year-ahead 17 1.99 3.14 0.81
Year-ahead 15 1.87 2.96 0.81
Year-ahead 13 1.79 2.76 0.75
Current-year 11 1.63 2.45 0.67
Current-year 9 1.54 2.28 0.62
Current-year 7 1.31 1.95 0.53
Current-year 5 1.15 1.72 0.47
Current-year 3 0.98 1.52 0.41
Current-year 1 0.87 1.34 0.36
Industrialized countries 
Year-ahead 23 1.43 1.98 1.01
Year-ahead 21 1.42 1.95 1.00
Year-ahead 19 1.39 1.91 0.97
Year-ahead 17 1.36 1.87 0.95
Year-ahead 15 1.25 1.71 0.92
Year-ahead 13 1.21 1.62 0.87
Current-year 11 1.10 1.47 0.79
Current-year 9 1.02 1.37 0.74
Current-year 7 0.92 1.25 0.67
Current-year 5 0.83 1.13 0.61
Current-year 3 0.71 0.99 0.53
Current-year 1 0.63 0.89 0.48
Developing countries
Year-ahead 23 2.67 4.13 0.91
Year-ahead 21 2.63 4.09 0.90
Year-ahead 19 2.60 4.04 0.88
Year-ahead 17 2.55 3.95 0.87
Year-ahead 15 2.45 3.78 0.87
Year-ahead 13 2.32 3.49 0.81
Current-year 11 2.06 3.04 0.70
Current-year 9 1.96 2.82 0.65
Current-year 7 1.66 2.40 0.55
Current-year 5 1.43 2.10 0.49
Current-year 3 1.24 1.88 0.43
Current-year 1 1.09 1.63 0.38little bit better than that of the WEO forecasts.7 The differences are marginal in the
case of forecasts for industrialized countries (particularly current-year forecasts),
but rather more substantial in the case of developing countries. So, assessed against
the performance of perhaps the single best-known alternative source of cross-
country forecasts, the private sector forecasts perform well in terms of accuracy.8 
As Diebold and Mariano (1995, p. 262) have emphasized, the superiority of
one source of forecasts in terms of forecast accuracy does not necessarily imply
that forecasts from other sources contain no additional information. To test if
WEO forecasts add information to the Consensus  forecasts, we estimate the
following regression:
A(t) = constant + b1CONSENSUS(t) + b2WEO(t) (3)
where, A(t) is the outcome, and CONSENSUS(t) and WEO(t) are the forecasts
from the two sources. Equations of the kind shown above are based on the litera-
ture on forecast encompassing (see Fair and Shiller (1990), and Holden and
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7One interesting extension to pursue would be to see if forecast accuracy in the case of countries with
IMF-supported programs differs from that in other cases. On the one hand, forecasts for program coun-
tries are subject to greater scrutiny, which may lead to greater accuracy. On the other hand, forecasts for
program countries are often arrived at after negotiations with the country’s authorities and may not repre-
sent true forecasts. See Musso and Phillips (2002) for a further discussion and evidence on the accuracy
of projections made as part of IMF-supported programs.
8We carried out a test, based on Diebold and Mariano (1995) and Diebold (2001, pp. 293–94), of
whether the better performance of the Consensus relative to the WEO is statistically significant. Our
preliminary results suggest that it is, but this result will need to be tested more rigorously in future work.
One reason is that the test is intended for a time series rather than a panel data context; we used fixed
effects to control for the panel nature of our data, but this may not be an adequate control.
Table 3. Comparison of Private Sector and WEO Accuracy
Year-ahead or  MAE MAE RMSE RMSE TU TU
Current-year Horizon Consensus WEO Consensus WEO Consensus WEO
All countries
Year-ahead 21 2.08 2.18 3.28 3.40 0.85 0.88
Year-ahead 15 1.87 2.09 2.96 3.31 0.81 0.90
Current-year 9 1.54 1.67 2.28 2.55 0.62 0.69
Current-year 3 0.98 1.05 1.52 1.63 0.41 0.44
Industrialized
Year-ahead 21 1.42 1.52 1.95 2.04 1.00 1.04
Year-ahead 15 1.25 1.35 1.71 1.82 0.92 0.98
Current-year 9 1.02 1.03 1.37 1.37 0.74 0.74
Current-year 3 0.71 0.75 0.99 0.99 0.53 0.53
Developing
Year-ahead 21 2.63 2.76 4.09 4.25 0.90 0.93
Year-ahead 15 2.45 2.79 3.78 4.26 0.87 0.98
Current-year 9 1.96 2.23 2.82 3.24 0.65 0.75
Current-year 3 1.24 1.34 1.88 2.07 0.43 0.48Thompson (1997)).9 If we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated b2
is zero, the WEO forecasts are encompassed by the Consensus forecast. We report
regressions with and without the constant term to see if the results of this exercise
are sensitive to assumptions about the unbiasedness of the Consensus forecast.
The regression results are reported in Table 4. Results are reported for all hori-
zons and countries pooled together and for each of the four horizons and two
country types separately. This gives a total of 30 regressions. The range of esti-
mates for b1 is between 0.7 and 1.3, with a substantial number of estimates very
close to 1. The range of estimates for b2 is –0.2 to 0.4, with a majority of the esti-
mates very close to zero. To the extent that the WEO forecasts are not encom-
passed by the Consensus forecasts, that tends to be the case for industrialized
countries, and even then for current-year forecasts only.
Another dimension on which forecasts can be compared is directional accu-
racy. We compute whether the forecasted change in growth is in the same direc-
tion as the actual change in growth. The fraction of forecasts that get the direction
right is shown in Table 5. For both sources of forecasts the fraction increases as
the horizon gets shorter and is higher for industrialized than for developing coun-
tries in the case of current-year forecasts. The relative performance does not
produce a clear winner: the WEO does better at a three-month horizon but gener-
ally a bit worse at the other horizons. 
To summarize the results of this section, the results for directional accuracy
are a statistical “dead heat,” whereas the evidence tends to favor the private sector
forecasts as being a little more accurate than, and encompassing, the WEO fore-
casts. The dominance of private sector forecasts is not wholly unexpected. The
Consensus forecasts are updated in a far more timely manner and with a shorter
“production lag” than the WEO forecasts. The consensus is also an average of
several individual forecasts which—even allowing for “herding” tendencies—
should tend to produce a more accurate forecast.10
It should also be noted that forecasts are only one component of the WEO; far
more attention is devoted to analyzing the global outlook, risks to it, and special
topics of policy interest. For Consensus Forecasts,h owever, forecasts are the
raison d’etre. 
IV. Forecasting Recessions
Fintzen and Stekler (1999, p. 309) note that “one of the most disturbing findings
of forecast evaluations is that, in the United States, recessions have generally not
been predicted prior to their occurrence.” As one country’s macroeconomic
history only yields a few observations of recessions, the cross-country sample
used here affords an opportunity for testing if the failure to forecast recessions is
Grace Juhn and Prakash Loungani
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9Equations of this kind can also be motivated on the basis of an older literature on combining fore-
casts (Bates and Granger (1969), and Granger and Ramanathan (1984)), where the focus is on finding the
optimal linear combination of available forecasts of an event. Diebold (1989) discusses the links between
the forecast combination and forecast encompassing literatures.
10See Gallo, Granger, and Jeon (2002) for evidence on copycat behavior among the individual fore-
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Table 4. Forecast Encompassing Tests
Year-ahead 
and/or  Adj. No. 
Current-year Horizon CONSENSUS WEO Constant R2 of Obs.
PANEL A: REGRESSIONS WITH A CONSTANT 
All countries
Both All 1.00 0.004 –0.39 0.52 1681
(0.03) (0.01) (0.10)
Year-ahead 21 0.83 (0.08) 0.01 (0.02) –0.34 (0.34) 0.21 403
Year-ahead 15 0.96 (0.07) 0.00 (0.02) –0.41 (0.28) 0.34 393
Current-year 9 1.21 (0.09) –0.10 (0.09) –0.50 (0.15) 0.67 455
Current-year 3 1.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) –0.07 (0.08) 0.87 430
Industrialized countries
Both All 0.97 0.18 –0.54 0.55 796
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Year-ahead 21 1.01 (0.30) 0.17 (0.24) –1.01 (0.48) 0.21 188
Year-ahead 15 1.25 (0.22) 0.10 (0.21) –1.18 (0.32) 0.41 189
Current-year 9 0.85 (0.17) 0.36 (0.15) –0.50 (0.14) 0.70 210
Current-year 3 0.84 (0.09) 0.28 (0.09) –0.22 (0.07) 0.91 209
Developing countries
Both All 1.01 0.01 –0.63 0.50 885
(0.04) (0.13) (0.17)
Year-ahead 21 0.92 (0.13) 0.01 (0.03) –1.07 (0.68) 0.19 215
Year-ahead 15 0.97 (0.10) 0.01 (0.03) –0.68 (0.52) 0.30 204
Current-year 9 1.28 (0.12) –0.15 (0.12) –0.76 (0.27) 0.65 245
Current-year 3 1.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02) –0.04 (0.15) 0.86 221
PANEL B: REGRESSIONS WITHOUT A CONSTANT
All countries
Both All 0.93 0.002 — 0.72 1681
(0.02) (0.01)
Year-ahead 21 0.76 (0.04) 0.00 (0.02) — 0.54 403
Year-ahead 15 0.88 (0.04) 0.00 (0.02) — 0.62 393
Current-year 9 1.17 (0.09) –0.14 (0.09) — 0.80 455
Current-year 3 1.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) — 0.92 430
Industrialized countries
Both All 0.82 0.15 — 0.80 796
(0.10) (0.09)
Year-ahead 21 0.69 (0.26) 0.15 (0.25) — 0.65 188
Year-ahead 15 0.97 (0.22) –0.03 (0.20) — 0.72 189
Current-year 9 0.67 (0.16) 0.37 (0.15) — 0.87 210
Current-year 3 0.80 (0.09) 0.25 (0.09) — 0.96 209
Developing countries
Both All 0.91 0.001 — 0.70 885
(0.02) (0.01)
Year-ahead 21 0.74 (0.06) 0.00 (0.03) — 0.51 215
Year-ahead 15 0.86 (0.06) –0.00 (0.03) — 0.59 204
Current-year 9 1.22 (0.12) –0.21 (0.12) — 0.79 245
Current-year 3 1.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02) — 0.91 221an ubiquitous feature of growth forecasts.11 One limitation is that the term reces-
sion—that is, a year in which real GDP declined—has to be interpreted rather
broadly to encompass cyclical downturns (as in the case of the United States in
1991), declines in output associated with transition from planned economies to
market economies (as in the case of Hungary and Poland), and declines associ-
ated with crises of various kinds (e.g., the ERM crisis of 1992–93, the Mexican
crisis (1995), and the global financial crises of 1997–99). There were a total of
72 episodes of recessions in our sample (Table 6).
The properties of forecasts during recession years are summarized in Table 7.
As shown in the first column, very few recessions are predicted a year in advance;
for instance, at a 13-month horizon negative growth was forecast in only 8 of the
72 episodes. There is then a discrete jump in the number of forecast of recessions;
at a 11-month horizon the number of cases of negative growth forecasts has risen
to 23 out of the possible 72 cases.12 The number of cases of forecasts of recessions
then rises steadily, reaching 54 at a one-month horizon. 
While forecasters increasingly start to recognize recessions in the year in
which they occur, the results in the second column show that the magnitude of the
downturn is underpredicted in the vast majority of cases. For instance, even as late
as December of the year of the recession, the forecast is more optimistic than the
outcome in 40 cases.
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Table 5. Directional Accuracy of Consensus and WEO Forecasts
Industrialized Developing
All Countries Countries Countries
Year-ahead or
Current-year Horizon Consensus WEO Consensus WEO Consensus WEO
Year-ahead 23 0.62 — 0.61 — 0.62 —
Year-ahead 21 0.62 0.60 0.60 0.56 0.62 0.62
Year-ahead 19 0.62 — 0.61 — 0.63 —
Year-ahead 17 0.62 — 0.60 — 0.63 —
Year-ahead 15 0.62 0.60 0.62 0.58 0.62 0.61
Year-ahead 13 0.68 — 0.71 — 0.66 —
Current-year 11 0.70 — 0.75 — 0.67 —
Current-year 9 0.71 0.70 0.77 0.78 0.68 0.66
Current-year 7 0.73 — 0.82 — 0.68 —
Current-year 5 0.75 — 0.85 — 0.70 —
Current-year 3 0.77 0.80 0.87 0.89 0.71 0.75
Current-year 1 0.80 — 0.91 — 0.75 —
11For evidence on how well recoveries are forecast, see Loungani (2002).
12That this jump coincides with the arrival of a new year suggests that there is a heightened focus by
both forecasters and their clients in the growth outcomes for the current year and perhaps lesser interest
in outcomes for the following year. FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THE ACCURACY OF PRIVATE SECTOR FORECASTS
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Table 6. List of 72 Episodes of Recessions 
(Countries that experienced recessions over the sample period are shown in bold.)
Developing Countries
Industrialized Asia-Pacific Latin American Transition and 
Country Group Countries Economies Economies Other Economies
List of Countries, Austria 1993 Bangladesh Argentina 1995, ’99 Bulgaria 1996, ’97
Recession year(s) Australia 1991 China Bolivia Czech Rep.  1998,
Belgium 1993 Hong Kong 1998 Brazil  1990, ’92 ’99
Canada 1991 India  Chile 1999 Hungary 1990, ’91,
Denmark  Indonesia 1998 Colombia 1999 ’92, ’93
Finland 1991, Korea 1998 Costa Rica 1996 Poland 1990, ’91
’92, ’93  Malaysia 1998  Dominican Rep. Romania 1997, ’98
France 1993  Pakistan  Ecuador 1999 Russia 1995, ’96,
Germany 1993  Philippines 1998 Mexico 1995 ’98
Greece 1993  Singapore Panama Slovakia
Ireland Sri  Lanka  Paraguay Slovenia
Israel Taiwan  Peru Ukraine 1995, ’96,
Italy 1993  Thailand 1997, ’98 Uruguay 1995, ’99 ’97, ’98, ’99
Japan 1998 Vietnam Venezuela 1993, ’94,
Netherlands  ’96, ’98, ’99 Egypt
New Zealand  Saudi Arabia 
1991, ’98 1995, ’99
Norway South  Africa








Table 7. Forecast Performance During Recession Episodes
(Total number of episodes = 72)
Average Average Average
Forecast Forecast Forecast
Year-ahead or  Error Error Error
Current-year Horizon Forecast<0 Forecast>Actual Full  Sample Industrialized Developing
Year-ahead 23 2 60 6.18 3.55 7.94
Year-ahead 21 2 60 6.05 3.50 7.76
Year-ahead 19 2 56 5.90 3.41 7.77
Year-ahead 17 2 56 5.67 3.27 7.46
Year-ahead 15 4 56 5.14 2.89 6.84
Year-ahead 13 8 60 4.66 2.48 6.11
Current-year 11 23 63 3.70 1.96 4.81
Current-year 9 26 61 3.16 1.60 4.17
Current-year 7 35 59 2.30 1.21 3.11
Current-year 5 41 54 1.69 0.87 2.31
Current-year 3 50 50 1.06 0.51 1.45
Current-year 1 54 40 0.57 0.21 0.81The final columns show the average forecast error at the different forecast hori-
zons over all 72 episodes and also for the industrialized countries and developing
countries separately. Note that average forecast errors continue to be quite substantial
even for forecasts made fairly late in the year of the recession. For instance, at the
three-month horizon, the average forecast error is 0.5 percentage points for industri-
alized countries and nearly 1.5 percentage points for developing countries; at the one-
month horizon the corresponding numbers are 0.2 and 0.8 percentage points.
A Goldman Sachs report (2001)13 contains an extended discussion of why
private sector economists tend to avoid forecasting recessions.14 First, recessions
are relatively rare events, which makes forecasting positive growth a pretty good
bet in most years. (In the sample used in this paper, years marked by recessions
comprise about 15 percent of the total number of country years.) Second, as a
related point, macroeconomic models are built to capture normal relationships
among variables and are hence not always suited to predicting recessions unless
there is a clear large exogenous shock. Third, there is a “herding” tendency among
forecasters. The report notes (p. 4) that,
“to forecast a recession substantially ahead of the pack, a forecaster must be
willing to deviate from the consensus in an extremely transparent manner,
knowing very clearly that in any given year a recession is a low probability
outcome.”
V. Forecaster Discord and Forecaster Uncertainty
In addition to the mean forecast, users of Consensus Forecasts often look at the
degree of discord across forecasters, as measured by the standard deviation of the
individual forecasts. For instance, the high standard deviation of forecasts in the
case of Japan over the last few years is taken to be a signal that developments in
Japan have been particularly difficult to forecast in recent times. The high standard
deviation could serve as a warning that the forecast accuracy for Japan’s growth
may be low. Conversely, a low level of forecaster discord might suggest that the
country’s growth prospects are relatively easy to forecast, and hence that one
should expect that the forecast error will be low.
How reliable is forecaster discord as a predictor of accuracy? To investigate
this issue, we estimate a regression of the (absolute value of the) forecast error on
the standard deviation of the forecast and other variables.15 The sample consists of
26 countries, listed in Table 8, for which individual forecasts are available. The
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13Cited with permission from Goldman Sachs.
14In a related discussion, Loungani (2000, 2001a) discusses two classes of theories for why reces-
sions might not be forecast. The first is that the information needed is lacking: forecasters either do not
have access to reliable real-time information or lack reliable models for translating available information
into predictions of a recession. The second is that the incentives for producing an “outlier” forecast (a
recession or a strong boom) are lacking.
15Recent work (e.g., Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold, 2002) makes it clear that the range of forecasts
(that is, max.–min.) can be a very informative volatility measure. It would be interesting to use the range
instead of the standard deviation in regressions of the sort reported in Table 8.data are pooled for these countries for four years (1995 to 1998) and for two fore-
cast horizons (the current-year April forecast and the current-year October fore-
cast);16 this yields a total of 208 observations.
The results of the estimation are given in Table 9. In addition to the standard
error, the following explanatory variables are included: (1) dummy variables for
each region and each year; (2) dummy variables to test whether the results are due
to outliers; and (3) a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the forecast was
made in April, and zero if the forecast was made in October. Since, as was shown
above, the forecast error is higher earlier on in the year than later, the expected
sign of the coefficient on this dummy variable is positive.
The initial regression in column (1) shows that higher forecaster discord is indeed
associated with higher forecast errors, controlling for the month of the forecast (April
or October). The coefficient estimate is positive and significantly different from zero.
Adding on region-specific fixed effects (column (2)) and year-specific fixed
effects does not materially affect the strength of the positive correlation between
(absolute) forecast error and forecaster discord. The inclusion of dummy variables
to pick up the effects of outliers (columns (4) and (5)) attenuates the correlation,
but it remains positive and significantly different from zero.
Overall, these results provide some support for the common practice of using
the standard deviation of the forecast as an rough indication of the difficulty of the
forecasting “terrain,” and consequently as one determinant of the magnitude of the
forecast error.17
VI. Conclusions 
This paper has assembled further evidence on the properties of private sector
growth forecasts for a large sample of countries. The main questions addressed,
and the answers suggested by the evidence, are as follows:
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16In principle, one could carry out a similar analysis for the year-ahead standard deviation as well.
17Zarnowitz and Lambros (1985) and Gallo, Granger, and Jeon (2002) caution against using the stan-
dard deviation (across analysts) as a measure of the standard deviation of the consensus.
Table 8. List of Countries Used in Forecaster Discord Regressions
Industrialized Countries Asia-Pacific Economies Latin American Economies
Canada Australia Argentina
France China Brazil
Germany Hong  Kong  Chile
Italy India Mexico
Japan Indonesia  Venezuela
Netherlands Korea
Spain Malaysia
Sweden New  Zealand
United Kingdom  Singapore
United States Taiwan
Thailand• How accurate are private sector forecasts?
In absolute terms,the magnitude of the errors tends to be larger for developing than
for industrialized countries. However, growth is more variable for developing
countries; if one adjusts for this fact, say by scaling the forecast error for a country
by the variability of its growth, the errors are a bit smaller for developing countries. 
• How does private sector accuracy compare with that of the IMF’s World
Economic Outlook? 
Private sector and WEO forecasts seem to be quite similar. Measures of accuracy
such as mean absolute error and root mean square error are better for Consensus
forecasts than for WEO forecasts, but the differences are not overwhelming. Tests
of directional accuracy do not reveal substantial differences between the two
sources either. Nevertheless, the WEO forecasts are encompassed by the
Consensus forecasts, suggesting that they do not add explanatory power to the
private sector’s forecasts.
• How well do forecasters predict recessions?
Updating earlier work, we show that very few of the 72 recessions that occurred
over the sample were predicted a year in advance and two-thirds remained unde-
tected by the April of the year in which the recession occurred. In over half the
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Table 9. Forecast Errors and Forecaster Discord
(Dependent variable: current-year forecast error, absolute value (AFE))
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Standard deviation of forecasts 2.0 1.9 1.8 0.7 0.6
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
(0,1) Dummy for April or Oct. forecast 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2
(April=1) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.1) (0.1)
(0,1) Dummy for Industrialized countries — –0.4 –0.5 –0.4 –0.2
(0.2) (0.2) (0.1) (0.15)
(0,1) Dummy for Asia-Pacific countries — –0.2 –0.2 –0.2 0.07
(0.2) (0.2) (0.13) (0.14)
(0,1) Dummy for 1995 — — –0.1 –0.1 –0.1
(0.2) (0.14) (0.1)
(0,1) Dummy for 1996 — — –0.5 –0.25 –0.2
(0.2) (0.14) (0.15)
(0,1) Dummy for 1997 — — –0.1 –0.02 –0.1
(0.2) (0.14) (0.15)
(0,1) Dummy for very high AFE — — — 4.0 —
(mean + 2 times s.d.) (0.3)
(0,1) Dummy for high AFE — — — — 2.9
(mean + s.d.) (0.2)
Intercept –0.2 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.4
(0.13) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2)
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.72 0.73
Number of observations 208 
(26 countries x 4 years x 2 forecast horizons)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errorscases, the forecast made in December of the year of the recession underestimated
its extent. This predictive failure could arise either because forecasters lack the
requisite information (in terms of reliable real-time data or reliable models) or
because they lack the incentives to predict recessions; further work would be
needed to discriminate between these two classes of theories. 
• Is forecaster discord a reliable predictor of forecast accuracy?
There is a positive relationship between the two: when there is greater discord
across forecasters, the forecast error tends to be larger, on average. At the same
time, the relationship is not overwhelmingly strong. This means that forecast
discord can be used as one element in trying to gauge the likely magnitude of the
forecast error, but it cannot be used as the only element.
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